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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
By ALBERT T. QUICK*
INTRODUCTION
The most notable feature of this survey period' was the
number of decisions on criminal procedure handed down by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. During the one-year period, 216
cases were decided, either by memorandum or formal opinion.2
In addition the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided twenty-
two cases, making a total of 238 cases. This figure is in contrast
to fifty-eight decisions handed down by the Court during the
prior survey period.3 This increase indicates that criminal pro-
cedure continues to be one of the major areas of conflict facing
both the bar and the bench.'
The decisions, though numerous, broke very little new
ground in the area of constitutional criminal procedure.' How-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.A. 1962, University of
Arizona; M.A. 1964, Central Michigan University; J.D. 1967, Wayne State University;
LL.M. 1974, Tulane University.
I July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1977.
2 The 216 Supreme Court cases included 39 full opinions and 177 memorandum
per curiam decisions.
3 Quick, Kentucky Law Survey-Criminal Procedure, 65 Ky. L.J. 447 (1977).
Some may have supposed that criminal procedure issues would have faded into
the background of appellate practice with the end of the Warren Court and its empha-
sis on individual rights.
I In addition to the decisions discussed in the text, six other decisions deserve
notice. In Romans v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1977) the Court held that
a defendant who voluntarily introduced evidence of his own prior conviction of a felony
is entitled to have the jury admonished as to the limited consideration which should
be given this information. In this regard Shockley v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 866
(Ky. 1967) was overruled.
In Huff v. Commonwealth, No. 76-103 (Dec. 3, 1976) (mem. per curiam) the Court
spoke to one of the remaining issues concerning a plain view seizure. The Court found
in this case that the investigator did not find the evidence in plain view because the
seizure was not inadvertent. The investigator had determined prior to the seizure that
heroin was present in the mobile home. When he returned to the mobile home it was
for the specific purpose of seizing the heroin. This holding appears to stand for the
proposition that it is not inadvertent when a law enforcement official expects to find
and seize contraband.
In Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1977) the Court upheld
Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965) in defining a "deadly weapon."
The ruling stated that any object can be a deadly weapon if intended by its user to
convince a victim that it is deadly and if the vicfim is in fact convinced.
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ever, certain areas that deserve review do reflect the Court's
present direction and philosophy.'
I. PRESERVATION OF ALLEGED ERROR
"Speak now or forever hold your peace" 7 is the message
being delivered to trial counsel by the Kentucky appellate
courts and the United States Supreme Court regarding the
preservation of error for appellate review. The consequences of
that message as set forth in the appendix' reflect that a signifi-
In Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977) the Court reviewed a trial
court's refusal to instruct on the defense of intoxication under Ky. REv. STAT. §
501.080(1) (1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The Court held that an instruction in
this matter is required only when the defense is raised. A defense is raised by:
[P]resentation of evidence that could justify a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt. The sufficiency of the evidence to accomplish that purpose
is a question of law for the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis....
There must be something in the evidence reasonably sufficient to support a
doubt that the defendant knew what he was doing.
Id. at 812.
An apparent conflict between the Supreme Court of Kentucky and the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky exists as to the necessity of holding a suppression hearing on
photographic identification. In Summitt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1977)
the Court held that it was not error for the trial court to refuse a motion to conduct a
pretrial hearing to suppress the in-court identification of defendant. In Cane v. Com-
monwealth, 556 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. App. 1977) the Court of Appeals held that:
If it is claimed that a photographic identification was so suggestive that
misidentification was likely, that question should be determined by the trial
court in a hearing outside of the presence of the jury following the procedures
outlined in Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969) and Britt
v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1974).
Id. at 907.
The court noted that if an evidentiary hearing had been requested and the trial
court failed to conduct such a hearing it would be grounds for vacating the judgment
and remanding the case for a hearing.
, The general direction is away from the philosophy underlying the Warren
Court's decisions involving criminal procedure. Presently, the focus of decision is on
the value of procedural rules, which if not complied with will diminish the defendant's
opportunity to litigate substantive issues. This focus is contrasted with the Warren
Court philosophy that maximized the defendant's opportunity to resolve substantive
issues.
The author acknowledges that these words are most often associated with the
consummation of marriage; however, they indicate the legal concept of making and
preserving the record.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky accounted for 216 of the total number of deci-
sions surveyed. Of these 216 cases, 78 of them (or 33.08%) involved at least one area
of waiver. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky accounted for 22 of the total number of
decisions surveyed. Of these 22 cases, 9 of them (40.91%) involved at least one area of
waiver.
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cant number of alleged errors were disposed of on the basis that
review had been waived at the trial stage. In order to ensure
proper review of these errors, trial counsel must be aware of and
comply with certain rules of criminal procedure. Failure in this
regard appears to have an impact in three areas. First, given
the United States Supreme Court's position limiting redress in
federal courts, defendants may soon find themselves without a
judicial forum in which to seek correction of certain errors.
Second, since the error is not subject to a decision on the mer-
its, it retards the development of appellate decisional law,
which serves as a guide to attorneys and lower courts. Third,
inadmissible evidence will be accorded legitimate status at the
trial and can form the basis of conviction (e.g., unconstitu-
tionally seized contraband drugs).
Because of this impact, it is appropriate to survey and
comment upon those areas in which there was a failure to com-
ply with the rules of criminal procedure. It should be noted that
this is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis; only those
areas that were in issue during the survey period will be exam-
ined. The format will be an examination of the issues in the
order in which they would generally arise in the prosecution of
a criminal case.
A. Suppression Hearings
One of the most important and significant methods to test
the admissibility of evidence is a suppression hearing This
hearing usually focuses upon evidence allegedly taken in con-
travention of the fourth" (search and seizure); fifth" (confes-
sions and admissions); sixth" (right to counsel); and four-
teenth" (shocking the conscience of the court) amendments. At
this hearing the defense and prosecution may introduce evi-
0 Some courts prefer to call this hearing an evidentiary hearing instead of a sup-
pression hearing. The designation, however, does not change the stated purposes of the
hearing.
' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
,2 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
12 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
19781
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dence 4 which will initially determine the issue of admissibil-
ity.' 5
In order for a hearing to be held, trial counsel must make
a timely motion,"6 and failure to do so will result in a waiver of
objection to the introduction and appellate review of the evi-
dence.'7 In Kentucky it is important to note that this motion'8
will be considered timely only if it is made prior to trial or if
an objection is made to the introduction of evidence at trial.'"
The current practice which allows counsel to make a mo-
tion to suppress at the trial stage is in contrast to many juris-
dictions which require that the motion be made prior to trial."0
It would seem that the mandatory pre-trial motion practice
2'
has certain advantages over the Kentucky rule. These advan-
tages include the assurance of the orderly presentation of evi-
dence without the interruption of the trial by a suppression
hearing; 22 the disposition of cases prior to trial that are depen-
" See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), wherein the Supreme Court held that
the prosecutor has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the voluntary
nature of a confession. See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), in
which the Supreme Court held that testimony given by a defendant at a suppression
hearing may not be used against him at his trial on the question of guilt or innocence.
,1 See Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969), and Britt v. Com-
monwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1974) which provided additional protection to the
defendant by allowing him to carry the admissibility of a confession to the jury. The
jury then has the responsibility not to consider the confession unless it believes it was
made voluntarily and free of coercion. This-protection, however, is not included within
Ky. R. CRiM. P. 9.78 (Confessions and searches; suppression of evidence) (Effective
January, 1978). This new rule provides tha't the factual findings of the trial court shall
be conclusive.
" See KRS § 422.110(2) (1972), which provides that a hearing must be held to
determine the competency and admissibility of a confession which may have been
obtained by "sweating."
17 By the use of the phrase "proper appellate review," the author recognizes that
substantial error may be reviewed even though insufficiently raised. See infra notes
64-90 for a further discussion of this point.
'1 As to the sufficiency of the motion, see Ky. R. CraM. P. 8.14; Stiltz v. Common-
wealth, 390 S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1965).
" See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1967); Relford v. Com-
monwealth, 558 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. App. 1977).
2 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1976);
ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, § 114-11(g) (Smith-Hurd 1977); MAINE RULES OF CRIM. PROC.
41(e) (Supp. 1975); and N.Y. CruM. PROC. LAW ANN. § 710.40 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
21 Certain exceptions to the mandatory requirement are recognized and generally
fall into these categories: (1) defendant was unaware of the grounds for a motion; and
(2) defendant did not have a reasonable opportunity to make a motion.
2 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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dent for prosecution on the suppressed evidence;2m the knowl-
edge by both parties concerning what evidence could be admit-
ted, thereby facilitating the preparation of the case; and fi-
nally, a decision before jeopardy attaches that would allow the
prosecution to appeal.24 Although trial tactics may in some
instances dictate otherwise,2m it is suggested for the sake of
judicial effectiveness that trial counsel request a pre-trial hear-
ing rather than wait until trial.
2
1
In addition to the issue of timeliness, it appears that a
separate2 7 hearing of record 8 is required before proper review
can be undertaken by the appellate courts. In Relford v.
Commonwealth,29 the appellant assigned as error the warrant-
less search of a vehicle. The court of appeals noted that there
was no "suppression hearing held prior to trial or during trial
outside the hearing of the jury."3" The failure to have a hearing
meant that the record on appeal did not reflect all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the warrantless search. Thus the
court concluded that without these facts it could not determine
which legal principles of search and seizure should apply.',
This decision points out the need for trial counsel to establish
a complete record of facts that would provide the basis for the
proper application of the law.
After a hearing has been held, it is incumbent upon the
judge to make findings of fact and law. The court of appeals
in Lee v. Commonwealth2 held that a trial court ruling which
stated, "This was a reasonable search,"" was not sufficient for
" An example would be a prosecution for the possession of a controlled substance,
wherein the substance which forms the basis for prosecution is ruled inadmissible.
24 See Commonwealth v. Shobe, - S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1977) for an interest-
ing decision concerning the Commonwealth's right to seek review prior to trial.
2 Defense counsel may want to delay his motion until jeopardy has attached in
hopes that this will bar further prosecution.
21 In Taulbee v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Ky. 1971) the Court also
made this suggestion.
" See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Relford v. Commonwealth, 558
S.W.2d 175 (Ky. App. 1977).
2 The requirement of a hearing would seem to preclude, as insufficient, unre-
corded arguments at the bench.
558 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. App. 1977).
Id. at 177.
31 Id.
312 547 S.W.2d 792 (Ky. App. 1977).
3 Id. at 794.
1978]
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purposes of review. This conclusionary statement concerning
the legality of the search was insufficient because "[w]e [the
court of appeals] are thus left in the dark as to whether the
trial judge applied the proper standards under Section 10 of our
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."34
It should be noted that a failure to make findings of fact
does not require reversal, but instead the case is remanded to
the trial court to make the required findings.
B. Trial Stage
1. Contemporaneous Objection Rule
A contemporaneous objection is required by Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.2231 (hereinafter cited as Cr.R.).
The theory behind this rule is to place on the trial counsel
the initial burden of shielding the jury from incompetent evi-
dence" and to allow the judge an opportunity to remedy any
errors in the proceedings." Thus, failure of counsel to make a
timely and sufficient objection will result in the evidence being
received" and considered and any error in its reception being
waived for purposes of proper appellate review.31
During the survey period noncompliance with Cr.R. 9.22
occurred in three ways: (1) complete failure to object, (2) an
untimely objection, and (3) an insufficient objection. The most
34 Id.
2 Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.22 provides:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for
all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is suffi-
cient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the court, and on request of the court,
his grounds therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling
or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter
prejudice him.
m R. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
R. LAWSON].
37 Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
3' It should be noted that in addition to evidence being received, closing argu-
ments by counsel must be objected to in a proper manner or they will also be received.
n Again, by the use of the phrase "proper appellate review" the author recognizes
that substantial error may be the subject of review even if insufficiently preserved. See
infra notes 64-90 for a further discussion of this point.
[Vol. 66
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glaring examples of noncompliance occurred at the closing ar-
gument stage of the trial. In the trial of a criminal case to a jury
one of the most critical stages can be the closing argument."
Perhaps for this reason it is "generally considered a matter of
courtesy verging on obligation for opposing counsel not to inter-
rupt one another's arguments to the jury."4 This "obligation,"
however, should not inhibit trial counsel from interposing an
objection in order to interrupt an erroneous argument. The
consequences flowing from a failure to object properly were
reflected in the following decisions handed down by the appel-
late courts.
In Patterson v. Commonwealth 2 the appellant assigned as
error the prosecutor's closing remarks that "[i]t's hard for me
to tell people of the Negro race apart" and that rape was not
conduct befitting a member of the human race . 3 The court of
appeals easily dispensed with the issue by noting that "[t]he
issue of prejudicial argument has not been preserved for review
through lack of objection."" This failure to make an objection
deprived the court of an opportunity to pass on the bounds of
legitimate argument, which could serve as a guide in future
prosecutions. 5
The Supreme Court, in Bowers v. Commonwealth," recog-
nized the impropriety of the Commonwealth's Attorney's clos-
ing statement which referred to evidence that was not in the
record. In this prosecution for murder47 the attorney argued
that the blood type found in the defendant's car was the same
type as that of the victim. In fact, the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney had never put into evidence the victim's blood type.48 In
" The importance of this stage may lie in the fact that it is trial counsel's oppor-
tunity to have personal contact with the jury and to reinforce and bring together in
one package the key evidence that has been introduced at various times throughout
the trial.
41 AMSTERDAM, 3 TRIAL MANuAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 1-435 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as TRIAL MANuAL].
,2 555 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. App. 1977).
" Id. at 610.
I !d.
The court did hold that the closing argument was not prejudicial; however, this
is not to say that it was without error.
" 555 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1977).
See KRS § 507.020(1) and (2) (Supp. 1976).
" 555 S.W.2d at 243.
1978]
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this case, an objection to the closing argument was made, but
only after the case was submitted to the jury and the jurors
were on their way to the jury room. Here, the timeliness of a
motion made pursuant to Cr.R. 9.22 was the issue. The Court
held in this regard that "[a]n objection, to be timely, must be
promptly interposed. . . The objection was untimely, and is
not preserved for appellate review."49 The clear impact of this
decision is that if the prosecutor goes beyond the bounds of
legitimate argument, counsel should immediately interpose an
objection.
It would appear that even if the objection is timely, de-
fense counsel must be concerned with the sufficiency of the
objection. This was the issue in Newell v. Commonwealth"
wherein an objection was properly interposed but was not
deemed sufficient to require consideration of whether a new
trial should be granted. In this case the closing statement as-
signed as error was: "We didn't commit Anthony Newell to the
life of crime that he has obviously undertaken.""1 The trial
court sustained an objection to this line of argument. However,
because defense counsel did not ask for an admonition or move
for a mistrial, the court did not feel compelled to consider
whether the statement was so prejudicial as to require a new
trial. 2 Thus, it appears that if the appellant seeks a new trial
he must base this on a request for an admonition or mistrial
which is then denied by the trial court.53
Examples of other cases dealing with the contemporaneous
objection rule included a failure to object to the prosecutor's
methods of impeachment of a defendant54 and the untimely
objection for removal of a trial judge.55
2. Instructions
Failure to make a proper objection to the jury instructions
accounted for a significant number of waivers. It was not ab-
49 Id.
549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977).
Id. at 90.
52 Id.
53 If the motion is granted it is assumed that this would dispel the prejudice.
Vanhook v. Commonwealth, No. 75-907 (Ky. Nov. 12,1976) (mem. per curiam).
Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
As reflected in Appendix A, there were 12 instances wherein there was a failure
[Vol. 66
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solutely clear from a reading of the cases why this was such a
frequent area of waiver. However, one reason may be that the
rule setting forth the procedures by which to object, Cr.R.
9.54(2)," is relatively new.
This rule became effective March 1, 1974, and signifi-
cantly changed the time frame in which to make an objection.
Under the prior rule an objection would be timely for purposes
of appellate review if made during trial or no later than a mo-
tion for a new trial." The new rule, however, provides that to
be considered timely an objection must be made before the
court instructs the jury.9 In addition, the rule provides that the
defendant may present his position by an offered instruction or
by motion. 0 It is implicit that the offer of an instruction or
motion be made no later than the giving of the instructions. 1
Finally, it should be pointed out that the offered instruction
can be written or oral and that an- objection must be specific
and state the grounds upon which it is based.12 Presumably,
with the passage of time trial counsel will become familiar with
the new rule, thereby reducing the number of waivers in this
area.6 3
to object properly to jury instructions.
Ky. R. CriM. P. 9.54(2) states:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruc-
tion unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an offered
instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the court
instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the
ground or grounds of his objection.
m The prior Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.54(2) provided that "[ult shall not be necessary in
order to preserve error that objections to instructions be made during the trial, but
unless so made they must be presented in a motion for new trial. No objection shall
be sufficient unless the specific grounds are stated." See Bradley v. Commonwealth,
439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1968); Piper
v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1965); Hartsock v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d
861 (Ky. 1964).
11 Ky. R. CriM. P. 9.54(2) states, "No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction. . . unless he makes objection before the court instructs
the jury .. " (emphasis added).
0 According to the rule, "No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an
offered instruction or by motion. .. ."
" See Hopper v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1974); D. MURRELL, KEN-
TUCKY CmAINAL PRACICE § 19.10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as D. MuRRELL].
Ky. R. CrIM. P. 9.54(2).
' The rule itself does not appear to present any difficulty in interpretation or
application.
1978]
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C. Palpable Error Doctrine4
A number of jurisdictions provide that an obvious error
affecting substantial rights of a party may be considered for
decision by the appellate courts even though insufficiently
raised or preserved for review.15 In Kentucky this doctrine is
embodied in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 61.02,6 which
also applies to criminal procedure."
It is apparent from a reading of the rule that not all errors
constitute palpable errors and that this doctrine only applies
to errors that encroach upon substantial rights and cause
manifest injustice.68 Thus, the Court has found palpable error
requiring reversal when information seriously eroded the credi-
bility of the prosecution's key witness" and when the jury disre-
garded a defense that was almost conclusively established.
70
This doctrine, which in effect broadens the appellate
courts' inquiry, rests on the principle that every court should
administer justice. In Davis v. Commonwealth,71 the Court ar-
ticulated this principle in these words:
An appellate court ought to be sensitive to the realities, and
if it believes there may have been a miscarriage of justice it
should use its extraordinary power and reverse a judgment
that there may be a fuller development of the facts so that
" This doctrine is also referred to as plain error, substantial error, and fundamen-
tal error.
"See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1258 (West 1970); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-47-9
(Burns 1975); MAINE RuLEs OF CRIM. PROC. 52; N.Y. CRm. PROC. LAW ANN. § 470.05(2)
(McKinney 1971); OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. Rule 52 (Anderson 1975); TENN. Sup. CT. R.
14(6).
"Ky. R. Civ. P. 61.02 provides:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court
on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injus-
tice has resulted from the error.
Incorporation is provided for by Ky. R. CraM. P. 13.04.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 61.02 should be read together with Ky. R. CanM. P. 9.26, which
provides: "A conviction shall be set aside on motion in the trial court, or the judgment
reversed on appeal, for any error or defect when, upon consideration of the whole case,
the court is satisfied that the substantial rights of the defendant have been preju-
diced."
, Stone v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1970).
70 Davis v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1942).
71 Id.
[Vol. 66
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the guilt of the accused, if he is guilty, may be more certainly
determined.
2
Against this background, it is interesting to note that dur-
ing the survey period the appellate courts refused to apply the
doctrine to questions involving an unreasonable search and
seizure;73 sufficiency of the Miranda warnings; 4 and the failure
of the Commonwealth to approve a case under the persistent
felony offender statute.75 However, of more than passing inter-
est is the decision of Salisbury v. Commonwealth.7" The im-
portance of this decision is not necessarily in the substantive
nature of the error, but rather in the method employed by the
court to determine that there was no palpable error. In
Salisbury, the Commonwealth's Attorney used the defendant's
silence, after he had been advised of his Miranda rights, for
purposes of impeachment. Trial counsel made no objection to
these tactics." On appeal, counsel urged the court of appeals
to set aside the verdict under the "palpable error" rule.
7
1
The court found that the Commonwealth's comment on
defendant's silence did involve his substantial rights. But the
court said, "It does not necessarily follow that there was palpa-
ble error."79 To determine this issue, the court felt compelled
to isolate the reason why trial counsel failed to object. The
record on appeal, however, did not reflect the reason for this
failure. In commenting on this fact, Judge Park concluded:
This court cannot determine whether the defendant's trial
counsel failed to object as a matter of trial tactics, whether.
he deliberately withheld making an objection in the hopes
that reversible error would slip into the record, or whether he
was unaware that there was a possible objection. Conse-
quently, Salisbury has not demonstrated that there was palp-
able error."
7 Id. at 780.
Relford v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. App. 1977).
" McClain v. Commonwealth, No. 75-1123 (Ky. Feb. 18, 1977) (mem. per cur-
iam).
11 Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977).
' 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
17 In order to preserve the error, compliance was required with Ky. R. CRIM. P.
9.22, the contemporaneous objection rule.
7' Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
7, Id. at 926.
Id. at 928.
1978]
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The court was operating under the apparent theory that if it
was a deliberate trial tactic of counsel, then the defendant
would be "estopped" from having the error form the basis of
reversal.81 This theory was reflected in part by the court's state-
ments that the burden to raise constitutional issues is placed
on defense counsel" and the defendant is bound by counsel's
failure to object, absent exceptional circumstances.
3
The implication of Salisbury is that the strategic blunders
of trial counsel in failing to preserve error will foreclose a deci-
sion of reversal under the palpable error rule. In that light the
decision appears somewhat contrary to prior Kentucky deci-
sions and the spirit embodied in the rule. The spirit of the rule
is to cure manifest injustice no matter how or by whom the
situation is caused. In Stone v. Commonwealth,4 the Court
determined there was manifest injustice created by the failure
to bring to the attention of the court and jury a key fact excul-
pating the defendant. It also should be noted that counsel com-
11 On petition for rehearing the court stated that its original opinion was supported
by the subsequent decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
The Wainwright decision narrowed the availability of a state defendant to seek
federal habeas corpus relief. Part of the Court's decision dealt with the effects of a
failure by the federal habeas court to require compliance with a state contempora-
neous objection rule. The effects of this failure were said to be: (1) sand-bagging by
defense lawyers who chance a verdict of not guilty in the trial court and intend to raise
the constitutional claim in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble did not pay
off; (2) state courts being less stringent in their enforcement of the rule, because they
know that a constitutional issue, although not properly preserved for review, may be
decided by a federal habeas court without their view of the issue, and (3) a weaken-
ing of the perception that a criminal trial in a state court is decisive of the issue.
The reason these effects are undesirable from the standpoint of a federal court is
based on considerations of federalism. Federalism demands a minimization of friction
between federal and state systems of justice and that federal courts give effect to the
state interests in enforcing its criminal procedure. However, considerations and effects
based on notions of federalism which restrict federal review are not present and should
not be considered in determining the scope of state appellate review. The focus in the
applications of a state palpable error rule should be twofold: (1) did the error affect
the substantial rights of the defendant and (2) did the error result in manifest
injustice? See infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Wainwright.
82 556 S.W.2d at 926. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
13 The exception noted by the court would involve a question "[o]f waiver. ..
in a non trial context. In this situation] the trial judge may have much greater respon-
sibilities to insure that there has been a knowing waiver of constitutional rights by the
defendant himself, e.g. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty pleas)." Salis-
bury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Ky. App. 1977).
456 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1970).
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pounded this original failure by not raising the key fact on
appeal. The decision in Stone and other cases85 turned on the
nature 6 and effects' of the error, and not on the way in which
it was allowed to go into the record. An appellant then should
be able to have recourse under the doctrine even if the error
were created by a deliberate act of trial counsel.8 8 The purpose
of the rule is to work justice, as noted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court:
A man is not to be deprived of his liberty and reputation
because of the inadvertence of a trial judge or the carelessness
of his counsel in failing to call the attention of the trial court
to palpable error which offends against the fundamentals of
a fair and impartial trial. 9
One other point about this decision that will also call for
clarification is the court's indication that appellant had the
burden to show palpable error. This fact, if correct, certainly
is not true in all cases. In this regard the Supreme Court, upon
its own initiative and review, found evidence establishing pal-
pable error in Stone v. Commonwealth."
D. Foreclosure of Statutory Right to Appeal9"
The foreclosure of the statutory right to appeal by the
defendant was the focus of certain decisions during the survey
0 See Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1974); Davis v. Common-
wealth, 162 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1942).
lThe inquiry is whether the nature of the error was such as to impinge upon a
substantial right of the defendant.
' The inquiry is whether the effect of the error was to cause manifest injustice.
M See C. WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856 (1969). In the civil
context it appears that some inconsistency of approach exists. See, e.g., Fortune,
Kentucky Law Survey-Civil Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 713 (1975), wherein the author
states: "Under what circumstances can the appellate court overlook the failure of
counsel to properly raise and argue the matters? Only when an error by the court can
be described as 'fundamental' can the failure of counsel to make timely objection be
excused." Id. at 717 (footnote omitted).
However, for an apparently contrary view, see Cobb v. Hoskins, 554 S.W.2d 886
(Ky. App. 1977), where the court held that "[in applying this rule, the palpable error
must result from action taken by the court rather than an act or omission by the
attorneys or the litigants." Id. at 888.
R Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 168 A. 244, 245 (1933).
" 456 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Ky. 1970).
" Ky. CONST. § 115 sets forth a constitutional right to appeal.
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period.2 Two of the decisions surveyed were styled
"Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam" and therefore lack value
as precedents. Nevertheless, these decisions are important in
reflecting current judicial attitudes and the emphasis accorded
to precedent.
The loss of the statutory right to appeal generally involves
two issues: (1) Did the defendant waive his right? and (2) Was
the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel by the fail-
ure to perfect an appeal? The Kentucky Supreme Court has
not consistently determined which of these issues will control
its decision concerning the defendant's forfeiture of direct ap-
peal . 3 In some cases, the Court has focused on the acts of
counsel and has held that counsel's failure binds the defen-
dant; in other cases, the Court has recognized that waiver by
the defendant should be the controlling issue. For example, in
Thompson v. Commonwealth,94 the record indicated that de-
fendant requested and was granted an appeal. However, no
appeal was taken because of either negligence or misunder-
standing by counsel.9 5 The Court, in deciding the issue, fo-
cused on the acts of counsel and held that "[i]f hired counsel,
due to error, negligence, or any other reason, fails to perfect
an appeal, defendant has lost his statutory rights to appeal.
Indigent defendants with appointed counsel run the same
risks."96 The Court then determined that negligence or mis-
understanding on the part of counsel did not amount to inade-
quate representation.
In short, the failure of the attorney to perfect the appeal
was binding on the defendant. This was the controlling factor
in the Court's decision. No inquiry was made to determine
whether the defendant himself waived his right to appeal.
A contrasting focus was found in Nalley v.
Commonwealth.7 Here, no appeal was taken due to counsel's
"1 This issue was heard by the appellate courts by a motion made pursuant to Ky.
R. CriM. P. 11.42 which allows the defendant to attack directly the validity of the
sentence imposed on him.
0 The reason for this lack of consistency may be that only one of the two issues
was raised on appeal and therefore the opportunity to decide was not presented.
" No. 75-855 (Ky. Oct. 1, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
' The defendant based his argument on ineffective assistance of counsel.
" Thompson v. Commonwealth, No. 75-855 (Ky. Oct. 1, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
' No. 75-1015 1/2 (Ky. Oct. 29, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
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belief that the appeal would be frivolous and unwarranted. The
defendant subsequently requested a belated appeal contending
that appointed counsel's assistance was inadequate. The re-
cord of the post-conviction hearing reflected that the defendant
was not initially aware of proper appellate procedures but had
expressed his desire to appeal. The Court, relying on Brown v.
Commonwealth,8 concluded that "[a]bsent an intelligent
waiver by appellant of his right to appeal, the court-appointed
counsel was under a duty to take the necessary precautions to
protect his client's right of appeal. .. .
The Court did not find an intelligent waiver and therefore.
granted the request for a belated appeal. In deciding as it did,
the Court implied that an intelligent waiver by a defendant
would be controlling even if counsel were inadequate. There-
fore, it would logically follow that the issue of waiver would
control when counsel is deemed adequate although acting neg-
ligently. The focus of the Court's decision in Nalley, therefore,
was on the issue of waiver.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky also dealt with these
issues in Adams v. Commonwealth."'0 In this decision the court
addressed both the issues of waiver by defendant and ineffec-
tive counsel. The facts established that the defendant was in-
formed of his right to appeal by the trial court and his ap-
pointed counsel. Counsel also informed the defendant that he
would not institute an appeal because it would be groundless
and frivolous. The court found that the defendant had waived
the right to appeal because he took no steps to perfect an ap-
peal after being informed of his rights."0 ' The court also deter-
mined that counsel had met his responsibility by informing his
client of the right to appeal and how to exercise that right along
with notice that he would not assist. 02 It is implicit that if the
defendant had made a good faith effort to perfect an appeal,
his failure to do so would not have constituted a waiver. Thus,
the controlling issue was whether a waiver had occurred.
$A 465 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1971).
" Nalley v. Commonwealth, No. 75-1015 /2 (Ky. Oct. 29, 1976) (mem. per cur-
Jam).
' 551 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. App. 1977).
'' Id. at 251.
102 Id.
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The diversity of treatment concerning this issue has the
potential for creating confusion and calls for clarification by
the appellate courts. In light of the newly established constitu-
tional right to appeal,1 3 the courts should be mindful that con-
stitutional rights are considered personal.0 4 Therefore, with
few exceptions, they can be forfeited by the individual himself
only in a voluntary and intelligent manner.0 "
E. Federal Habeas Corpus Relief0 6
Congress has provided for a writ of habeas corpus through
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970) which provides
review "[i]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of the state court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States." This remedy has furnished numerous de-
fendants' 7 a judicial forum to seek redress for constitutional
violations which have not been properly preserved for state
review and decision.
However, in a series of cases beginning in 19768 the
United States Supreme Court has significantly reduced the
availability of this writ when there is a failure to comply with
state procedural law. The Court has accomplished this by nar-
rowing the applicability of the deliberate by-pass rule which
was enunciated in Fay v. Noia.'"9
In Fay, the Court determined that a failure to comply with
"' Ky. CONST. § 115.
£04 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1968), where the Supreme Court
stated, "We adhere to these cases and to the general rule that Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights. ... Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
W05 One of the foremost exceptions, where a third party can waive a constitutional
right of another, is the so-called third-party consent area. Here, certain third parties
may waive or assert the constitutional protection of another party. See Butler v.
Commonwealth, 536 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1976), where a babysitter consented to a search
of a "visitor" located on the premises.
10 This is not to be considered a complete examination of the requirements for
obtaining federal habeas corpus relief. For a review of the requirements, see D.
MuRaRsu, supra note 61, at § 23.10.
107 There were 7,883 habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners out of a total of
19,809 petitions for the year ending June 1976. ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIREcToR OF THE
ADhNiSTRA7iVE OFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS 189 (1976).
"I0 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976);
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
1- 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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state procedural rules would not bar relief unless there had
been a deliberate by-pass of the state procedures. In deciding
what was meant by a "deliberate by-pass" the Court stated:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent
counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly fore-
went the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims
in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any
other -reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate
bypassing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal
court on habeas to deny him all relief. ...,,0
The focus in determining whether this limitation should
apply was on the knowing"' and deliberate nature of peti-
tioner's action. Thus, inadvertence or neglect on the part of
counsel in the preservation of error at the state level was not
necessarily considered a deliberate by-pass. For example, re-
view was granted when counsel inadvertently failed to make
timely objection to comments on the defendant's pretrial si-
lence;" 2 when counsel neglected to request an instruction on
causation when the trial strategy was based on the fact that
defendant did not cause death;"3 when petitioner failed to per-
fect an appeal because of the lack of funds and knowledge;'
when counsel failed to challenge properly an affidavit for a
search warrant;" 5 and finally, when counsel failed to develop
properly his jury exclusion contention."'
Starting with Francis v. Henderson"7 the Burger Court has
pursued a path leading to the restrictive application of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a), the habeas corpus statute."' The petitioner
in Francis sought state collateral relief in order to challenge the
racial composition of the grand jury. Relief was denied because
trial counsel did not raise the claim prior to trial as required
, Id. at 439.
"' See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
,, Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975).
", Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1976).
"' Wade v. California, 450 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1971).
", Patterson v. Brown, 393 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1968).
' Moore v. Dutton, 432 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1970).
117 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
I's See Note, Stone v. Powell and The New Federalism: A Challenge To Congress,
14 HARv. J. LEGIS. 152 (1976), where the author notes that the Court's restriction in
the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) may constitute an interference with the power
of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
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by Louisiana law. '19 The defendant was granted habeas corpus
relief by the federal district court 2' but the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed.'21 The Supreme Court affirmed
even though the defendant did not participate in the waiver
and trial counsel, because of bad health and lack of experience,
did not deliberately by-pass state procedures. The majority,
apparently ignoring Fay v. Noia,'2 2 fashioned a different test to
determine the applicability of the habeas corpus proceeding
involving a challenge to the composition of a state grand jury.
The Court stated the test this way: "In a collateral attack upon
a conviction that rule requires, . . . not only a showing of
'cause' for the defendant's failure to challenge the composition
of the grand jury before trial, but also a showing of actual
prejudice.' ' 3
This "cause" and "prejudice" rule has since been rein-
forced' 24 and expanded to cover a defendant's contention that
he did not understand his "Miranda rights."'' 25 The decision to
extend the application of the rule was announced in
Wainwright v. Sykes.' 21 In that case, the defendant was tried
and convicted of murder in the third degree. At the trial, the
"I At the time of the Francis trial, Article 202 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure stated:
All objections to the manner of selecting or drawing any juror or jury or
to any defect or irregularity that can be pleaded against any array or venire
must be filed, pleaded, heard or urged before the expiration of the third
judicial day of the term for which said jury shall have been drawn, or before
entering upon the trial of the case if it be begun sooner; otherwise, all such
objections shall be considered as waived and shall not afterwards be urged
or heard.
Francis v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896, 897 (5th Cir. 1974).
' Francis v. Henderson, No. 73-3670 (E.D.La. Sept. 20, 1973).
,2, Francis v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
' 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
" Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (Footnote omitted).
"2 See Gates v. Henderson, No. 76-2065 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1977).
'2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The "Miranda rights" generally in-
clude the following:
1. The defendant has the right to remain silent.
2. Anything the defendant says will be used against him in a court of law.
3. The defendant has the right to consult with an attorney before any
questioning and the defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney
during questioning.
4. If the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the court will appoint one
for him.
126 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
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defendant's inculpatory statements were admitted into evi-
dence. Trial counsel did not object to these admissions, nor did
the trial judge question their admissibility. The defendant sub-
sequently challenged the admissibility of the statements in
state court. Relief was denied and he then petitioned the fed-
eral district court which granted relief pursuant to the federal
habeas corpus statute.'2 This decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.'2 The Supreme Court
accepted the state's determination that defense counsel had
not made a timely objection to the admission of the evidence.
Thus, the Court stated the main issue as being whether "the
rule of Francis v. Henderson, barring federal habeas review
absent a showing of 'cause' and 'prejudice' attendant to a state
procedural waiver, [should] be applied to a waived objection
to the admission of a confession at trial. '12 9
A majority of the Court answered this question in the af-
firmative. The deliberate by-pass rule established in Fay was
held inapplicable to this type of situation."' Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion, left the definition of the
"cause" and "prejudice" standard for future cases. He did,
however, indicate that the standard was narrower than the
deliberate by-pass rule.
1 3'
For defense counsel these decisions will increase the diffi-
culty in redressing constitutional violations under the federal
habeas corpus statute when the violation has not been pre-
served at trial. 32 In addition, even if an objection is made in a
timely fashion, review will apparently be denied when the con-
stitutional claim is based on the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule. In Stone v. Powell,133 the Court held that "[w]here
the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evi-
I" Wainwright v. Sykes, No. 75-1781 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
' Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976).
"' Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82 (1977).
" Id. at 81.
'3' Id. at 83.
132 Although Wainwright dealt with an apparent fifth amendment violation, the
"cause" and "prejudice" rule can easily be expanded to other constitutional violations.
1- 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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dence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial." '34
When these decisions are read together they make an im-
portant impact in two directions: first, the restrictions being
placed on the federal forum '35 and second, reinforcement of the
finality of state court judgments. In the field of criminal juris-
prudence one of the problems felt by state appellate judges'36
is that their decisions lack finality and can be altered by the
federal courts. This feeling should no longer be as persistent
and state courts will increasingly carry the heavy burden as the
final arbitrators of justice.
II. THE PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER STATUTE
The new Kentucky Penal Code contains some dramatic
changes concerning the purpose for and application of the stat-
ute enhancing punishment for recidivists. These changes as
embodied in the new persistent felony offender statute' 37 are
most apparent when contrasted with the prior law. The now
superseded statute provided:
Any person convicted a second time of felony shall be con-
fined in the penitentiary not less than double the time of the
sentence under the first conviction; if convicted a third time
of felony, he shall be confined in the penitentiary during his
life. Judgment in such cases shall not be given for the in-
creased penalty unless the jury finds, from the record and
other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for
felony committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state.'1
The apparent purpose of this statute was to deter a first
offender from further criminal activity,'39 and "the double pen-
alty is held in terrorem over the criminal, for the purpose of
affecting his reformation. ... 0However, this dual purpose
of deterrence and reformation was not carried over into the new
,' Id. at 494 (footnotes omitted).
"' See SocIErY OF AMERIcm LAW TEACHERS, Supreme Court Denial of Citizen
Access to Federal Courts to Challenge Unconstitutional and Other Unlawful Actions:
The Record of the Burger Court 2-3, 18-21 (October 1976).
"I See Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1977).
117 KRS § 532.080 (Supp. 1976).
'1 KRS § 431.190 (repealed).
In, Cobb v. Commonwealth, 101 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 19316).
11 Id. at 420, quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W. 496, 496 (Ky. 1896).
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provision. Designed "principally for individuals who have dem-
onstrated lack of capacity for rehabilitation, the provision as a
whole contains a change of direction in sentencing objectives,
i.e., from rehabilitation of individual offenders to protection of
the public by incapacitation of dangerous individuals." ''
With this shift in purpose, from deterrence and reforma-
tion to protecting the public from the incorrigible and danger-
ous nature of the individual, came a corresponding shift in
application. This shift is reflected by an expansion in the na-
ture of proof necessary to establish a persistent felon.4 2 For
example, the prosecuting authority must establish that: (1) the
offender is more than twenty-one years of age;' (2) the of-
fender stands convicted of a felony after having previously been
convicted of at least one prior felony;'44 (3) he was over the age
of eighteen at the time the offenses were committed;'45 (4) he
was sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more or was
sentenced to death;' and (5) the defendant:
1. Completed service of the sentence imposed on the pre-
vious felony conviction within five (5) years prior to the date
of commission of the felony for which he now stands con-
victed; or
2. Was on probation or parole from the previous felony con-
viction at the time of commission of the felony for which he
now stands convicted; or
3. Was discharged from probation or parole on the previous
felony conviction within five (5) years prior to the date of
commission of the felony for which he now stands con-
victed.'47
The creation of this burden is to help ensure that only
those who have achieved relative maturity and have failed to
respond reasonably to rehabilitation are subject to sentence as
persistent felony offenders.
1" KY. PENAL CODE, Final Draft (1971), Commentary to § 3445 at 347 [hereinafter
cited as Final Draft].
"' See KRS § 532.080 (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 532.080(2) (Supp. 1976) for second degree; KRS § 532.080(3) (Supp.
1976) for first degree.
'" KRS § 532.080(2) and (3) (Supp. 1976).
I's KRS § 532.080(2)(b) (Supp. 1976) for second degree; KRS § 532.080(3)(b)
(Supp. 1976) for first degree.
'" KRS § 532.080(2)(a) for second degree; KRS § 532.080(3)(a) for first degree.
' KRS § 532.080(2)(c)(1), (2), (3).
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During the survey period a number of cases were decided
which relate to the application of the statute or its constitu-
tionality. Those decisions dealing with application will be ex-
amined first, followed by a discussion of the constitutional is-
sues.
In Newell v. Commonwealth,'48 the prosecution failed to
establish Newell's age on the date that he committed the first
of his prior offenses. This failure was in clear derogation of the
statutory requirement defining a persistent felony offender."'
The Court recognized this fact when it held that "[p]roof that
a defendant was over the age of eighteen at the time of the
commission of the prior felony offense is an essential element
of the persistent felony offender statute. . . ."I" However, be-
cause defense counsel failed to preserve properly this error for
appellate review, proof of such essential element was deemed
waived.1 51 There was no indication on the part of the Court that
it would invoke the palpable error doctrine. '52 It appears that
a consideration of this sort would have been well-founded be-
cause a substantial right of the defendant was affected (i.e.,
greater deprivation of liberty, and manifest injustice did exist).
A finding of injustice could have been based on the purpose of
the age requirement which is to "restrict application of this
section to persons who have gained maturity but are still bent
on criminality."15 3 Thus, without proper proof of age, there
appears a greater likelihood that the statute will be applied to
persons for whom it was not intended.
The Court did, however, take an opportunity to deal with
the merits of this issue in Adams v. Commonwealth.5 4 Again
the Commonwealth failed to meet the burden of showing that
the defendant was above age eighteen on the date when one of
1' 549 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1977).
1,9 KRS § 532.080(3)(b).
, Newell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Ky. 1977).
,5, The Supreme Court of Kentucky noted in Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, 550
S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1977), that "[w]hen the evidence is insufficient to sustain the burden
of proof on one or more, but less than all, of the issues presented by the case, the correct
procedure is to object to the giving of instructions on those particular issues." Id. at
529 (emphasis in original).
,52 See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the palpable
error doctrine.
'1 Final Draft, supra note 141, at 348.
15, 551 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1977).
[Vol. 66
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
the prior felonies was committed. The Commonwealth at-
tempted to prove the defendant's age through indirect proof.
The prosecution contended that since defendant was nineteen
or twenty when he was convicted, it could reasonably be in-
ferred that he was over the age of eighteen when he committed
the offense. The Court rejected this contention and stated that
"such an inference would be entirely too tenuous and cannot
be drawn."' 55 The failure to prove the age element meant rever-
sal of the persistent felony offender conviction and resentenc-
ing on the principal offense. Thus, the Court has given some
indication concerning the nature and quality of proof necessary
to establish that one is a persistent felony offender.
Two final points should be made concerning the necessary
proof to establish the criteria set forth in the statute. First, in
.satisfying the requirement of prior offenses, the prosecution in
Brown v. Commonwealth'56 introduced copies of the indict-
ments. The Court noted that this practice was not necessary;
however, it declined to determine whether it was error since the
issue was not preserved for review.'57 Secondly, the Court is
holding to the principle that sentencing is not a critical stage
of the proceedings. Therefore, the Commonwealth is not re-
quired to show that counsel was present at defendant's prior
sentencings.'55
The new persistent felony offender provision represents a
decided improvement over the prior law in eliminating poten-
tial constitutional objections.' There were, however, two con-
stitutional attacks on the 1974 provision. In Hardin v.
Commonwealth, 0 the appellant argued that the separate pro-
ceeding, wherein his status as a persistent felony offender was
determined, put him twice in jeopardy.'"' The Court did not
find a violation of the pertinent sections of the United States
"' Id. at 564.
"5 551 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1977).
For a case involving a determination of this issue under the prior law, see
Hardin v. Commonwealth, No. CA-336-MR (Ky. App. May 13, 1977).
Is See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) for the requirement of counsel at trial
if the prior conviction is to be used to enhance punishment.
"It One of the issues most often raised is the fact that at one trial both the
"principal" offense and habitual criminal status is decided. See Murray v. Common-
wealth, 474 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Ky. 1971).
"I No. CA-336-MR (Ky. App. May 13, 1977).
I' Id.
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or Kentucky constitutions."'2 Its decision was premised on the
fact that the sentence imposed under the persistent felony of-
fender statute supplanted the sentence imposed for the
"principal"'' 13 offense. The Court thus concluded that "[t]he
substituted sentence comes with the newly acquired status.
KRS 532.060 does not punish twice for the same offense and
therefore it is constitutional."'64
A more intriguing constitutional attack was.presented in
Brown v. Commonwealth.6 5 Here, the appellant moved that
the principal count and the persistent felony offender count be
tried before different juries.' 6 This motion was denied, appar-
ently based on that portion of the statute which states: "Such
proceeding [second stage] shall be conducted before the court
sitting with the jury that found the defendant guilty of his most
recent offense unless the court for good cause discharges that
jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose.'
'
)
6 7
The appellant based his argument on the application of
the statute wherein the same jury could determine both counts.
It was his contention that this condition would necessarily dim-
inish his right to testify in the first stage of the trial; and that
through cross-examination to impeach his credibility, he would
be forced to admit his prior felonies' 6 to the same jury who
would subsequently determine the question of whether those
convictions had been adjudicated against him. To guard
against this fact, he argued that he should be afforded separate
juries and an order prohibiting the use of testimony concerning
previous convictions at the second stage of the trial.
The Court rejected this attack by reference to the constitu-
tionality of the prior law when the jury in one stage rendered a
verdict on the "principal" offense and the habitual offender
charge. The relevance of this frame of reference was that
"[u]nless that procedure [prior law] is currently held uncon-
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Ky. CONST. § 13.
" This term is used to denote the felony for which he was last convicted.
,6, Hardin v. Commonwealth, - S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1977).
" 551 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1977).
,16 The law provides for a bifurcated trial; however, the same jury can sit at both
stages.
167 KRS § 532.080(1) (Supp. 1976).
16S See R. LAWSON, supra note 36, at 57 for the rules regarding the admission of
prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment.
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stitutional, neither can the procedure followed in this case be
unconstitutional, because certainly it was more favorable to
the defendant than the old one-stage trial Would have been."'69
The Court noted that the bifurcated trial does not elimi-
nate the Hobson's choice of either remaining silent or risking
impeachment. Justice Palmore concluded:
If the defendant in a criminal case wants to be a witness, he
just has to do it under the same terms and conditions and
undertake the same risks and burdens as any other witness.
The Constitution cloaks him in a multitude of special favors
and protections, but not yet does it crown him king. 7'
The constitutionality of the present statute appears to be
on relatively solid ground. However, constitutional questions
may still remain concerning the selection of those to be prose-
cuted under the statute; 7' the notion that punishment is based
on a "status"; 172 and, in an individual case, the possible im-
position of excessive punishment.1
3
II, 551 S.W.2d at 560.
170 Id. at 560-561. It is interesting to note the theory set forth in the last sentence
of this quotation, because this author is of the opinion that the Constitution serves as
a limitation on governmental action through the fourteenth amendment and does not
grant special favors.
M This argument would be one cast in terms of equal protection in the application
of this statute.
02 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"1 Note, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth Amendment: A Disproportionality
Analysis, 1974 WASH. U. LAW Q. 147.
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APPENDIX*
Survey Period July 1, 1976, to June 30, 1977
Court of Supreme Total Cases
Appeals Court Surveyed
Number of Cases
Involving Criminal
Procedure Issues 22 216 238
Number and Percent 9 73 82
of Cases Involving
Waiver (40.91%) (33.80%) (34.45%)
Areas of Waiver
1. Suppression Hearing 2
2. Trial
a. Counsel 1
b. Contemporaneous objection 34
c. Sufficiency of objection 4
d. Instruction 12
e. Ineffective counsel 5
3. 11.42 matters 14
4. Appeal 3
5. Miscellaneous 16
Total Number of Waivers 91
Note: The total number of waivers is greater than the total
number of cases because some cases contained waivers in more
than one area.
* This appendix was prepared with the able assistance of Barbara
Gunther, my research assistant and a second-year law student
at the University of Louisville.
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